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Abstract 
Officer-involved killings and racial bias in policing are controversial political issues. Prior 
research indicates that (perceived) group threat measured in terms of population shares 
and race-specific crime rates are important explanations for variations in police killings 
across cities in the United States. We argue that a diverse police force that proportionally 
represents the population it serves mitigates group threat and thereby reduces the num-
ber of officer-involved killings. Count models support our argument. They show that of-
ficer-involved killings of African Americans are higher in cities with factors commonly 
associated with group threat, including ethnic/racial polarization and black-on-white 
homicides. A diverse police force, however, reduces the influence of group threat lower-
ing the number of officer-involved killings of African Americans. The findings represent 
one of the first analysis of a highly relevant contemporary issue based on a recent and 
high-quality dataset from 2013 to 2015. By highlighting the interaction between group 
treat and the proportional representation of minority groups in police departments, our 
research advances group conflict and threat theories with important theoretical and pol-
icy implications for law enforcement and representative bureaucracies more broadly.  
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Introduction 
Around 12.02 pm on August 9, 2014, Michael Brown – an 18-year old African-American 
teenager – was fatally shot by Darren Wilson, 28, a white Ferguson police officer. Ac-
counts of the incident differ widely, but the event and others like it drew national atten-
tion to killings of African Americans at the hands of police. The renewed interest in police 
killings and racial disparities in the use of police force more broadly continues to rever-
berate across the country. Yet, research on contextual variations in police killings is sur-
prisingly rare. It generally relies on unreliable data about “justifiable homicides of felons” 
irregularly reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Jacobs and O’Brien 1998; 
Smith 2003; Willits and Nowacki 2014; Zimring and Arsiniega 2015). This article uses a 
new and contemporary dataset on officer-involved killings to examine variations in po-
lice use of deadly force across cities in the Unites States. Extending intergroup conflict 
and threat theories, we argue that a diverse police force that proportionally represents 
the population it serves mitigates group threat and thereby reduces the number of officer-
involved killings. Perceived levels of threat posed by racial and ethnic minorities is a 
prominent account in research on variations in formal levels of social control such as po-
lice use of force. A diverse and inclusive police force, however, has the potential to reduce 
tensions and thereby weaken the influence of factors that are commonly associated with 
perceived group threat. Increased police legitimacy, the knowledge and empathy of mi-
nority officers, and more frequent interracial interactions within the police might attenu-
ate tensions between the police and African-American communities. Homogenous de-
partments, in contrast, might strengthens the notion of the us versus them or “blue versus 
black”. This argument implies both a direct effect of police diversity and, more im-
portantly, a negative interaction between various factors of group threat and an inclusive 
police force. 
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To examine our argument, we construct a comprehensive database of all officer-
involved killings between 2013 and 2015 based on verified crowd-sourced information 
from “Fatal Encounters” (Burghart 2016).3 For each major city, we link the number of of-
ficer involved killings to population data from the U.S. Census, crime data from the 
F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports, and information on police agencies from the Law En-
forcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) data series collected by 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Our analysis provides one of the first contemporary 
views on the determinants of police use of deadly force based on a recent and high 
quality database from 2013 to 2015. Using negative binomial regression, we find that of-
ficer-involved killings of blacks but not non-Hispanic whites are higher in cities with 
factors commonly associated with group threat, including ethnic/racial polarization and 
black-on-white homicides. A diverse police force, however, reduces the influence of 
these group threat factors lowering the number of officer-involved killings of blacks. 
The findings make new and substantial contributions to our understanding of a highly 
contentious social, cultural and political issue. By highlighting the interaction between 
group threat and the proportional representation of minority groups in police depart-
ments, our research advances group conflict and threat theories with important theoret-
ical and policy implications for law enforcement and representative bureaucracies more 
broadly.  
 
Minority Threat and the Deadly Use of Police Force 
Over 20 years after the Rodney King beating sparked a public outcry about racism in the 
police force, the excessive use of force remains a matter of great concern and a divisive 
political issue making national headlines. A prominent explanation of racial and ethnic 
                                                
3 Data are available publicly at http://www.fatalencounters.org/spreadsheets/ (last visited April 25, 2016). 
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disparities in many areas of criminal justice including the deadly use of police force builds 
on political or threat explanations. Based on broader theories of race relations and group 
threat (Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958), this explanation focuses on the ways in which domi-
nant or privileged groups use the police, criminal law and other state instruments to 
maintain racial hierarchies and inequalities when their interests are threatened (Baumer, 
Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent 2005; Jacobs and O’Brien 
1998; Liska 1992; Smith and Holmes 2014; Stults and Baumer 2007; Turk 1966). Racial 
disparities in arrests, sentencing, the use of (deadly) police force and other coercive crime 
control mechanisms are partly driven by deeply rooted social divisions that separate 
dominant and subordinate racial and ethnic groups (Chambliss 2001; Liska 1992; Smith 
and Holmes 2014).  
Most empirical work in this tradition focuses on the minority threat hypothesis. It 
states that the minority population share or in-migration increases the perceived level of 
threat in the general population, which in turn raises support for aggressive policing 
strategies including the use of police force or at least gives the police additional leeway 
(Liska 1992). Empirical studies generally support the idea that the relative size of the 
black population is related to different aspects of social control such as the size of the 
police force, arrests, incarceration rates and other (Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg 2002; 
Jackson and Carroll 1981; Jacobs and Carmichael 2002; Jacobs and O’Brien 1998; Legewie 
2016; Liska 1992; Smith and Holmes 2014; Stults and Baumer 2007). Focusing on the 
deadly use of force, Jacobs and O’Brien (1998) use data from the early 1980s and find that 
the number of officer-involved killings of blacks is higher in areas with a large proportion 
and recent in-migration of African-Americans. Ross (2015) similarly links racial dispari-
ties in officer-involved shootings to the portion of black residents and the overall level of 
inequality. Other researchers move beyond the focus on the presence or in-migration of 
minority groups. Instead, they argue that polarized settings in which two equal-sized 
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opponents face each other are the most contentious situations (Esteban and Ray 1994; 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). 
Recent work tries to explicate the mechanisms that explain the relation between 
the share of minority residents and the level and intensity of crime control (Eitle et al. 
2002; King and Wheelock 2007; Stults and Baumer 2007). Stults and Baumer (2007), for 
example, explicitly measure perceived economic and political threat, whites’ fear of crime 
and prejudice as key components of the underlying process. They find that fear of crime 
and perceived economic threat account for a substantial part of the relation between mi-
nority population share and police size. Along similar lines, Eitle et al (2002) distinguish 
between political, economic and crime threat. Using county-level data from South Caro-
lina, they find that black-on-white crime substantially increases black arrest rates. Black-
on-black crime as well as political and economic threat, however, are unrelated to arrests. 
Together, these findings highlight the importance of considering crime-related threat as 
a possible explanation of police use of (deadly) force aside from the traditional focus on 
population shares. 
The “racial threat” thesis highlights the importance of inter-group tensions and 
conflict for the deadly use of police force. The core prediction from this literature is that 
various factors that are associated with perceived levels of threat increase the deadly use 
of police force against minorities. In the following analysis, we focus on out-group size 
and in-migration, ethnic/racial polarization and black-on-white crime as important 
measures of group threat. They capture both the traditional focus on population shares 
and composition (out-group size and ethnic/racial polarization) as well as the threat of 
(black) crime argument highlighted by a number of recent studies (Eitle et al. 2002; Stults 
and Baumer 2007). Despite the prominence of threat based explanations, previous re-
search has largely ignored the racial/ethnic composition of the police department as a 
potentially important moderating factor. Here, we argue that a diverse police force that 
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proportionally represents the population it serves mitigates group threat and thereby re-
duces the number of officer-involved killings. 
 
Group threat and the racial composition of the police force 
Group threat theories generally emphasize the interest of the dominant group as a driv-
ing factor for minority threat. Recent work, however, also highlights that police are a 
distinct social group with their own interests including concerns about safety, legal pro-
tection, public image and in other areas (Holmes 2000; Smith and Holmes 2014). These 
interests influence police behavior including responses to minority citizens on the street 
such as the use of police force. Indeed, Holmes argues that the “salience of threats per-
ceived directly by the police should be more important than distal threats to the dominant 
group in predicting their street-level responses to minorities” (Holmes 2000:350). Along 
similar lines, Legewie (2016) shows that violent attacks against police officers increase the 
subsequent use of police force against African-Americans but not against other groups. 
From this perspective, group conflict based on the notion of the police against minority 
groups and the perceived level of threat among officers are important drivers of police 
use of (deadly) force. The contemporary debate reinforces this perspective with “blue 
lives matter” emerging as a counter movement to “black lives matter”. The focus on po-
lice departments as a distinct social group also highlights potentially mitigating factors. 
Here, we argue that a diverse police force that proportionally represents the population 
it serves mitigates group threat and thereby reduces the number of officer-involved kill-
ings. 
Diversifying the force and minority representation in policing emerged as an im-
portant issue in the 1960s (Stokes 1997). Partly in response to the urban riots and concerns 
about tensions between police and minority groups, many argued that law enforcement 
agencies should ethnically and racially represent the communities they serve. Indeed, 
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“virtually every national report on the police over the past twenty years has recom-
mended increased employment of minorities and women” (Walker 1985:555) including 
President Obama’s 21st Century Task Force on Policing. The increasing calls for a pro-
portional representation of minorities in the ranks of the police led to a series of political 
and administrative steps to hire African American officers (Stokes 1997; Walker and Katz 
2011).  
Over the following decades, the proportion of African-American officers increased 
substantially. In 2013, it reached 13.0% in our sample of cities compared to 16.3% among 
the residents.4 The overall increase conceals substantial variations across cities in the 
United States. Minority members remain underrepresented in most police departments 
(see Figure 2 on page 27). Prominently, the protests in Ferguson confronted a predomi-
nantly black community with a nearly all-white police force (4 out of 53 sworn officers in 
the Ferguson Police Department are black). Few empirical studies have examined the re-
lation between the racial composition of the police department and police use of force. 
An important exception is Smith (2003), who studies the influence of police officer diver-
sity on the number of officer-involved killings using F.B.I. data from the Supplementary 
Homicide Report (Zimring and Arsiniega 2015; see below for a detailed discussion of 
different data sources). His findings indicate that officer diversity is unrelated to the num-
ber of police killings. Aside from revisiting Smith findings with better data, our argument 
extends previous research.  
Based on previous work on minority representation in police departments and 
broader sociological theories, we argue that minority representation not only reduces po-
lice killings directly but also mitigates group threat and thereby lowers the number of 
officer-involved killings. In particular, police officer diversity influences policing through 
four processes. First, minority representation increases police legitimacy among minority 
                                                
4 The estimates are based on LEMAS data (see below for further details). 
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residents, which has important implications for police citizen interactions (Bell 2002; 
Theobald and Haider-Markel 2008; Weitzer 2000). Following the literature on symbolic 
representation, public attitudes and behavior towards state bureaucracies can change 
simply based on the characteristics of representatives or non-elected officials (Gay 2002; 
Mansbridge 1999; Theobald and Haider-Markel 2008). Minority representation signals 
that police officers share similar values and experiences. The officers are seen as more 
knowledgeable about minority concerns and culture, which increases trust among mi-
norities. Recent empirical evidence from police-citizen interactions (Theobald and 
Haider-Markel 2008) and many other areas such as political institutions (Banducci, 
Donovan, and Karp 2004; Gay 2002; Scherer and Curry 2010) supports this argument. 
Increased trust and legitimacy, in turn, attenuate tensions between the police and Afri-
can-American communities and potentially deescalates police citizen interactions (Bell 
2002; Theobald and Haider-Markel 2008). 
Second, minority officers might not only change the perception of the police 
among the public but they are also more knowledge and empathetic about minority con-
cerns and culture themselves. This knowledge and empathy might influence their own 
behavior and affect the overall department culture spreading to other officers. Similar to 
substantive representation in parliaments, minority presence in the police introduces dif-
ferent views that are aligned with and reflect minority interests (Sun and Payne 2004). A 
number of studies indicate that black officers are less biased toward black citizens  
(Antonovics and Knight 2009; Anwar and Fang 2006; Fagan et al. 2016; Fagan and Geller 
2010) although other findings are mixed (Sun and Payne 2004). The role of black police 
associations over the last decades also highlights the influence on the overall policing 
community (Walker, Spohn, and DeLone 2012:180). After the Rodney King beating, the 
National Black Police Association (NBPA), for example, highlighted that racism is wide-
spread in the police. Today, NBPA continues to push for an end to police brutality and 
supports federal legislation that prohibits racial profiling. This response to recent events 
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stands in contrast to the reaction of other police organizations. It highlights how minority 
officers provide a different perspective that influences policing culture and moderate ten-
sions between the police and African American communities. This perspective may 
partly be driven by a sense of linked fate between black officers and black citizens that 
produces empathy in their interactions with each other (Dawson 1994; Simien 2005). 
Third, a higher number of minority officers in the police provide opportunities for 
contact and interactions between white and minority officers. The experiences and infor-
mation from these interactions increase familiarity and reduce hostility “potentially 
changing the police agency’s culture toward a more positive view of minority communi-
ties” (Goldstein 1977; Smith 2003). This argument is closely related to inter-group contact 
theory. Contact theory generally posits that contact between groups facilitates inter-
group relations by improving attitudes towards the out-group and by reducing stereo-
types (Pettigrew 1998). Allport’s (1954) classical formulation of the theory and many sub-
sequent studies focus on situational factors such as equal status, common goals, and co-
operation as conditions for the positive effect of inter-group interactions. Police-citizen 
interactions usually do not fulfill these conditions with a clear hierarchy and often op-
posing goals between the officer and the citizen. Interactions between officers, however, 
do. They are generally among equal or similar status positions. The interactions involve 
cooperation to achieve a common goal. Accordingly, interactions between white and mi-
nority police officers and the direct contact with close friends or coworker can improve 
attitudes towards the out-group among all officers, mitigate negative sentiments and re-
duce stereotypes about African-Americans. 
Fourth, minority officers can weaken the solidarity within the police community 
particularly when confronted threats (Smith 2003; Walker et al. 2012:180). The link be-
tween solidarity and diversity has been studied across the social sciences. In an influen-
tial article, Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) distinguish between four sources of social 
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capital. They argue that bounded solidarity is not based on shared values or reciprocal ex-
changes between individual, but on “the situated reaction of a class of people faced 
with common adversities […] It is limited to members of a particular group who find 
themselves affected by common events in a particular time and place” (Portes and 
Sensenbrenner 1993:1325). From this perspective, homogenous police departments are 
likely to respond to perceived threats with higher solidarity that is based on the notion 
of “us” against “them” or blue versus black. Along similar lines, research on friendship 
networks suggests denser ties and consequently solidarity in homogenous settings. The 
response by African American police organizations to the Rodney King beating or re-
cent events and the linked fate perspective described above support this argument. It 
highlights how minority officers introduce a different perspective that undermines a 
uniform response to certain events and perceived threats.  
Together these factors might reduce the overall level of police use of (deadly) force 
and weaken the role of factors that are commonly associated with group conflict and 
threat. Increased police legitimacy, the knowledge and empathy of minority officers and 
more frequent interracial interactions within the police might attenuate tensions between 
the police and African-American communities. Weakened police solidarity might under-
mine the notion of the police versus black youth. Homogenously white departments, in 
contrast, might strengthens the notion of the us versus them or “blue versus black”. Ac-
cordingly, a diverse and inclusive police force has the potential to reduce tensions and 
thereby weaken the influence of factors that are commonly associated with perceived 
group threat. Based on this argument, we expect that minority representation not only 
reduces the number of officer-involved killings directly but also mitigates the role of fac-
tors that are commonly associated with group threat. This argument implies both a direct 
effect of police diversity and, more importantly, a negative interaction between various 
factors of group threat and an inclusive police force. 
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Data and Methods 
To address our question, we examine variations in the number of police-involved deaths 
of African-Americans and non-Hispanic whites across major cities in the United States. 
In particular, we focus on all cities with more than 50,000 residents that are part of the 
2013 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) sample. LE-
MAS includes almost all police departments with over 100 officers and a random sample 
of departments with less officers. About three in four (476 of the 635) U.S. cities with a 
population of over 50,000 are included in LEMAS and are the basis for our sample.  
To measure the number of police killings in each city, we construct a comprehen-
sive database of all officer-involved killings between 2013 and 2015 based on verified 
crowd sourced information from “Fatal Encounters” (Burghart 2016). We define police-
involved deaths as any interaction with the police that results in death as a consequence 
of police use of force. This definition excludes accidents caused by suspects themselves 
(e.g. a fleeing suspect who causes a deadly car crash) or deadly domestic violence inci-
dences involving off-duty police officers. The focus incidents related to police use of force 
is important insofar as it focuses on officer-involved killings that are potentially related 
to our core theoretical argument. For each city, we link the number of officer involved 
killings to population data from the U.S. Census, crime data from the F.B.I. Uniform 
Crime Reports, and information on police agencies from the Law Enforcement Manage-
ment and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) data series collected by the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics. Using negative binomial regression, we model the number of officer-involved 
killings of blacks as a function of population characteristics, crime rates, our three threat 
related measures and the racial/ethnic composition of the police department. 
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Constructing a Comprehensive Database on Police Killings 
As widely publicized in the media and discussed in recent academic publications, the 
government does not collect reliable information on police killings (Hirschfield 2015; 
Ross 2015; Zimring and Arsiniega 2015).5 The most commonly used official information 
source is the annual F.B.I. Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR), a special data series 
that is part of the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) (Jacobs and O’Brien 1998; Sorensen, 
Marquart, and Brock 1993; Willits and Nowacki 2014).6 SHR is an important data source 
for research on homicides but has limitations for work on officer-involved deaths. It in-
cludes a category for “felon killed by police” that tallies about 400 cases per year. Report-
ing by state and local police agencies is voluntary and “felon killed by police” narrowly 
refers to justifiable police homicides excluding unjustifiable, officer-involved deaths 
(Hirschfield 2015; Loftin et al. 2003). Indeed, comparisons with recent crowd-sourced and 
media-initiated data collection projects suggest that the SHR captures only about one 
third of police-involved deaths (Loftin et al. 2003). To address this problem, we construct 
a comprehensive database of all officer-involved killings between 2013 and 2015 based 
                                                
5 Here are some of the media reports: Washington Post (http://blogs.wsj.com/numbers/why-the-data-on-
justifiable-homicide-just-wont-do-1725/), the New York Times (http://www.ny-
times.com/2015/05/01/us/no-sharp-rise-seen-in-police-killings-though-increased-focus-may-suggest-oth-
erwise.html), the Guardian (http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/18/police-killings-govern-
ment-data-count) and FiveThirtyEight (http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-many-americans-the-po-
lice-kill-each-year/). 
6 There are two alternative, official data sources. First, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 
National Vital Statistics System (NVSS) is based on death certificates and includes a category for homi-
cide by “legal intervention”. Second, the Bureau of Justice Statistics published an independent count of 
“arrest-related homicides” from 2003 to 2009 but suspended the data series and acknowledged that the 
count is not complete (Burch 2011; Planty et al. 2015). The yearly count for both alternative data sources 
resembles the data from the Supplementary Homicide Reports and is far below recent crowd-sourced 
and media-initiated data collection projects (Loftin et al. 2003). A third official data source with some 
promise is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Violent Death Reporting System but 
as of January 2016 it only covers 32 states (Barber et al. 2016). 
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on verified, crowd-sourced information from “Fatal Encounters”. The construction of our 
dataset is based on four steps. 
First, we use information collected by “Fatal Encounters” (Burghart 2016) as a 
starting point. The goal of Fatal Encounters is to “create a comprehensive national data-
base of people who are killed through interactions with police” from 2000 to today 
(Burghart 2016). It is the most comprehensive data collection project that tracks officer-
involved killings over multiple years (for a comparison of different data sources see Table 
1 and subsection “Data Quality”). The project relies on paid researchers, public records 
requests and crowd-sourced data. As of January 2016, the archive considers the infor-
mation complete from 2013 to 2015, with 1,209, 1,251 and 1,294 cases for each of the three 
years. Fatal Encounters includes information on any interaction with police that results 
in death. This definition is broader compared to our own and includes accidents and 
deadly domestic violence involving police officers as perpetrators. Accordingly, we ex-
clude about 120 cases for each of the years that do not fit our definition of officer-involved 
killing. 
Second, we verified and completed missing information for each of the 3,485 rec-
ords. While the database is comprehensive and well-maintained, there are occasional er-
rors and missing information. Most important, information on victim race is missing for 
about 30% of all cases and considered unreliable for others. To address this problem, we 
use two independent coders from Amazon Mechanical Turk to verify and complete the 
information for all 3,485 cases.7 In particular, we gave each coder the victim’s name, date 
                                                
7 Amazon Mechanical Turk (https://www.mturk.com/mturk) is an online platform or marketplace that 
allows researchers (known as Requesters) to post jobs (usually small data collection or coding tasks and 
surveys). Workers can select existing jobs and complete them for a monetary payment. The platform pro-
vides access to over 500,000 workers and thereby makes it possible to complete data collection and coding 
task within hours instead of months. A common critique of the platform is that it often involves sub-mini-
mum wage labor. To ensure a fair compensation of workers, we coded 100 cases ourselves and used the 
time estimate to calculate an hourly wage of $14. 
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of the incident and the state in which it occurred. They were asked to collect information 
on the race of the victim, the involved police agencies and the city in which the incident 
occurred from newspaper sources. Accordingly, the key variables were essentially col-
lected three times (by Fatal Encounters and our two coders). We personally cross-vali-
dated all cases for which the information from Fatal Encounters, the first and second cod-
ers were not identical. This cross-validation and the comparison between the two inde-
pendent coders ensures the quality and accuracy of the data verification process. Aside 
from verifying key information, the procedure completes information on the race of the 
victim for 74% of the cases with missing information on victim’s race. 
Third, we use name and place-based imputation for the remaining cases with miss-
ing information on race. Our procedure largely resembles Enos’ approach (2016).  It relies 
on the “probability that a victim’s surname is associated with a particular race or ethnicity 
according to U.S. Census Bureau counts of names by race”. For example, Smith as the 
most common name in the United States is “73.35% white, 22.22% black, 0.4% Asian and 
Pacific Islander, 0.85% American Indian, 1.63% mixed race, and 1.56% Hispanic”. Follow-
ing Enos (2016), we take the frequencies for each victim’s surname and combine them 
with the racial demographics of the census block were the victim lived. These two sources 
of information are combined using Bayes’ rule (see Enos 2016 for details on the approach). 
As a result, we obtain a probability that each victim is white, black, Hispanic, Asian and 
Pacific Islander, American Indian, or mixed race.  
To account for the uncertainty inherent in these probabilities and the overall im-
putation procedure, we obtain ten plausible race/ethnicities for each case with missing 
information based on random draws from a multinomial distribution using the name and 
place-based probabilities as parameters for the distribution. A victim that is 80% white 
and 20% black based on their name and residents, for example, might receive eight plau-
sible race values “white” and two plausible race “black” (note that for most cases the 
probability for one of the different racial/ethnic groups is above 80%). Similar to multiple 
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imputation, we repeat all of our analyses for each of the different plausible values and 
combine the result using Rubin's (2004) repeated imputation summary statistics (for a 
similar approach to measurement error see Blackwell, Honaker, and King 2015; or 
Legewie and Schaeffer 2016 for an application to a different area). As a result, the final 
analyses account for the uncertainty from the imputation procedure.  
Finally, we link our database with population data from the U.S. Census, crime 
data from the F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports, and information on police agencies from the 
Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) data series col-
lected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Linking each record to these different data 
sources requires matching keys for police agencies and census designated places (or 
counties if the incident does not fall in a census designated place). In both cases, we use 
name-based matching with manual corrections for cases without exact matches. As a re-
sult, we obtain the Originating Agency Identifier (ORI) code from the “Law Enforcement 
Table 1 - Comparison of Data Sources on Police Killings, 2015 
Source Method and Definition Cases 
Unique 
Cases 
Missing 
Cases 
% Race 
Missing 
Fatal 
Encounters 
Crowd-sourced information, police re-
ports, monitoring of news outlets, free-
dom of information requests. Definition: 
All interactions with the police that result 
in death (including off-duty officers). 
1,294 166 0 22.5% 
The 
Counted 
(The 
Guardian) 
Police reports, witness statements, moni-
toring regional news outlets, research 
groups and open-source reporting pro-
jects. Definition: Any deaths arising di-
rectly from encounters with law enforce-
ment. 
1,140 22 10 2.0% 
Washing-
ton Post 
News reports, public records, Internet da-
tabases and original reporting. Definition: 
All shooting deaths from on-duty police 
officers. 
990 4 142 2.8% 
Our Data See description in text. 1,162 - - 0% 
Note: The data from all three sources was downloaded on January 14, 2016. 
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Agency Identifiers Crosswalk” database created by Bureau of Justice Statistics8 and the  
census designated place 5-digit code. These matching keys allow us to link each case to 
various data-sources including population data from the U.S. Census, crime data from 
the F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports, and information on police agencies from the Law En-
forcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) data series.  
The result of this procedure is a comprehensive database on officer-involved kill-
ings between 2013 and 2015. The database not only includes verified information on all 
officer-involved killings but also links this information to other data sources. Linking 
these different data sources is a key part of understanding the determinants of police. 
Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of all 3,485 cases across the United States.  
                                                
8 The crosswalk includes over 36,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States and assigns each 
agency the Originating Agency Identifier (ORI) code, which makes it possible to merge various data 
sources that have no common match keys. 
Figure 1 - Officer-Involved Killings, 2013-2015 
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Data Quality 
We use two alternative data sources to evaluate the quality and completeness of our data 
on officer-involved killings. In particular, we compare our database with The Counted 
from The Guardian and The Washington Post’s list of police killings.9 Both are independ-
ent datasets that collect information on people killed by police in the United States in 
2015. Table 1 compares the different data sources. For 2015, Fatal Encounter (FE) includes 
166 unique cases that are not part of the other datasets and zero missing cases (a compar-
ison for 2013 and 2014 is not possible because the other two datasets only focus on 2015 
and beyond). We exclude many of the unique cases from our own database because FE 
uses a broad definition of officer-involved killings that includes family-related murders 
involving off-duty officers and other incidents (see beginning of section for details).  
Most important, there is not a single case in the Washington Post and the Counted 
database that is not part of FE. With about 30% of missing information, however, the 
quality of information on victim’s race is substantially lower in the original FE database. 
Our coding procedure described above substantially improves on that and is closely 
aligned with The Counted and The Washington Post estimates. For 2015, there are just 14 
cases or 1.1% for which the race coding is not the same so that the error rate is very small. 
Overall, the comparison with the two alternative data sources indicates that (a) Fatal En-
counters is the most complete enumeration of officer-involved shootings in 2015; (b) it is 
the only collection effort that covers multiple years, and (c) the quality of the information 
on victim’s race is low in the original database but substantially improved through our 
own data collection. The multiple year feature of the FE data is important considering 
                                                
9 The two databases are available at http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interac-
tive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database and https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings/ (both accessed on Feb 1, 2016). 
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that our analyses of officer-involved killings can aggregate data across multiple years to 
avoid scarcity by city due of the low number of cases for many jurisdictions. 
 
Estimation Strategy and Model Specification 
In our general analytic model, we use the number of officer-involved killings of African 
Americans and non-Hispanic whites in each city as the dependent variable and various 
group-threat measures, crime rates and minority representation in the police force as the 
main independent variables. The outcome is a count variable confined to positive inte-
gers. Poisson regressions are well suited to model such count data.  However, the under-
lying distribution assumes that the mean and variance are equal (Gelman and Hill 
2007:114). An alternative is to model the number of police killings with negative binomial 
regressions to allow for excess variability (over-dispersion) among the outcome (Gelman 
and Hill 2007:115; Long and Freese 2005:Cha. 8).10 Formally, the model can be expressed 
as 𝜆" = exp	(𝛼 + 𝑫"𝛿 + 𝜃𝑈" + 𝑿"𝛽 + 𝜁") 
where 𝑖 is the index for city and 𝜆" the number of officer involved killings in city 𝑖. The 
coefficients in the vector 𝛿 for the different group threat measures in the matrix 𝑫" esti-
mate the relation between the main independent variables and the outcome variable con-
ditional on the covariates in 𝑿". The minority representation index defined below is rep-
resented by 𝑈" with the corresponding coefficient 𝜃. To evaluate our argument that mi-
nority representation mitigates group threat, we extend our models with a set of two-
                                                
10 An inflated number of zero counts are another common concern with count data (Gelman and Hill 
2007:126). Zero-inflated models address this problem by using two components that correspond to differ-
ent processes. The first is a binary model to analyze structural zeros and the second is a count model to 
predict the counts. There is, however, no reason to believe that the number of police killings is driven by 
two distinct processes (Allison 2012:Cha. 9 also see http://statisticalhorizons.com/zero-inflated-models). 
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way interaction terms between each of the group-threat measures and the minority rep-
resentation index  𝛾5(𝐷"(5)×𝑈") etc. 
 In a separate set of regressions, we use exposure variables to model the rate and 
not the count of police killings (Osgood 2000). The exposure variable (also called offset) is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the population size in 100,000’s with a coefficient that 
is fixed to 1. This exposure variable accounts for the fact that the “risk” of being killed by 
the police depends on the size of the respective population. As a result, the additional 
regressions analyze the rate of police killings per 100,000 residents across major cities in 
the United States and not the number.  
 
Variables and Missing Data 
The variables used in the analysis are based on the U.S. Census, crime data from the F.B.I. 
Uniform Crime Reports, and information on police agencies from the Law Enforcement 
Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) data series collected by the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics. The dependent variable is the number of officer-involved killings in 
each city between 2013 and 2015 (see last section for description of data).  Aggregating 
multiple years of data is important considering the low number of cases in most jurisdic-
tion. The main independent variables are population and crime-related measures of 
group threat and minority representation in police departments measured on the city 
level or for the corresponding police department. Table 2 includes a list of all variables 
together with basic summary statistics. 
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  Table 2 - Description and Summary Statistics of Variables by Source 
Variable Description Mean SD 
    
Pol. Killings of Blacks Number of Officer-involved killings of blacks 0.87 2.67 
Pol. Killings of Whites Number of Officer-involved killings of whites 1.03 2.31 
    
Census and American Community Survey   
Population City population in 100,000s 1.90 3.21 
Population (Black) Black city population in 100,000s (offset) 0.32 0.81 
Population (White) White city population in 100,000s (offset) 0.87 1.10 
Prop. White Proportion white residents 0.54 0.22 
Prop. Black Proportion black residents 0.14 0.16 
Change in Prop. Black Change in prop. black residents btw 2000 and 2010 0.01 0.04 
Black/White Income 
Ratio 
Ratio of black median household income to white 
median household income 
0.72 0.24 
Prop. Divorced Proportion of divorced residents 0.11 0.02 
Prop. Crowded Hous-
ing Units 
Proportion of crowded housing units with 1.5+ 
persons per room 
0.04 0.05 
Gini Index Measure of income inequality in city 0.45 0.04 
Prop. Poverty Proportion of residents living in poverty 0.18 0.08 
Ethnic Polarization Index of Ethnic Polarization (EP) 0.73 0.15 
    
Uniform Crime Reports, Various Data Series   
Arrests Black (log) Number of black arrests for homicides, violent or 
property crimes, and weapon charges (logged) 
3.88 9.19 
Arrests White (log) Number of white arrests for homicides, violent or 
property crimes, and weapon charges (logged) 
5.79 8.95 
Violent Crime Rate Number of violent crimes per 100,000 residents 490.89 351.44 
Officers per 100,000 Number of police officers per 100,000 residents 181.11 72.82 
Homicide Rate: 
     Black on Black 
Average number of black on black homicides over 
five year period (2009-2013) per 100,000 residents 
1.71 3.07 
Homicide Rate: 
     Black on White 
Average number of black on white homicides over 
five year period (2009-2013) per 100,000 residents 
0.35 0.43 
    
Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS)   
Proportional Repre-
sentation Index (PRI) 
Ratio of percent Black-sworn police officers in the 
police department to percent Black residents 
0.75 0.93 
    
Other Sources    
Black Mayor Binary indicator for black city mayor 0.07 0.26 
South Binary indicator for southern state 0.30 0.46 
Note: All continuous variables except PRI are standardized for the analysis. The summary statistics for 
black/white arrests are in 1,000s. The analyses include the logged number of arrests. 
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We focus on four main independent variables. First, we measure the proportion of 
African-American in each city in 2010 and the change in the African-American population be-
tween 2000 and 2010. The variables are based on data from the 2000 and 2010 United 
States Census using census “places” as the geographical unit.11 Second, we use the pop-
ulation shares from the census for each city (or census place) to measure the level of eth-
nic/racial polarization using the index of Ethnic Polarization (EP) (Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol 2005).12  
Third, we measure the black-on-white homicide rate based on data from the UCR 
Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR) from 2009 to 2013. Similar to the outcome varia-
ble, cross-racial homicides are rare. To address this problem, we define our measure as 
the average number of black-on-white homicides per 100,000 residents over a five-year 
period. A second advantage of using multiple years is that not all police departments 
consistently report data to the SHR system so that in some cases we average over a shorter 
period. The models also condition for black-on-black homicide rate as a control variable 
defined in the same way (see below).  
Finally, we measure minority representation in police departments with the Propor-
tional Representation Index (PRI) based on the Equal Employment Opportunity Index 
(Hickman and Piquero 2009; Lewis 1989; Smith 2003). It is defined as the “ratio of percent 
Black-sworn police officers within the police department to percent Black residents”. A 
value of one indicates that the proportion of black officers in the police department is the 
same as the proportion of black residents in the city it serves. Most cities, however, have 
lower values indicating that black officers are underrepresented in the police force (see 
                                                
11 In very few cases, a 2010 city was not incorporated in 2000 and therefore not part of the census places 
file. For these cases, we used the 2000 census tracts that fall within the 2010 city limits to estimate the pop-
ulation in 2000.  
12 Formally, the index is defined as 𝐸𝑃 = 1 − 0.5 − 𝑠" 0.5 @		𝑠"A"B5 , where s is the population share of 
group i and I is the number of groups in a given city. 
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Figure 2 for a distribution of the index across our sample). The measure is based on data 
from the 2013 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) 
data series collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. In irregular intervals, LEMAS col-
lects information from state and local law enforcement agencies including almost all po-
lice department with 100 or more officers and a nationally-representative sample of 
smaller departments.  
 Our analyses include a number of control variables. First, we include several pop-
ulation characteristics based on the U.S. Census and the American Community Survey 
2010-2013 3-year estimates. The measures are (a) the logged population size in 100,000s, 
(b) the black/white income ratio, (c) the black poverty rate defined as the proportion of 
African-American residents that are poor, (d) the proportion of divorced residents as a 
measure of family stability, (e) the Gini index as a measure of income inequality, and (f) 
the proportion of crowded housing units (1.5 or more residents per room). These 
measures capture important population characteristics of the city that have played a sig-
nificant role in research on policing and other areas of social and economic conditions. 
They are closely tied to previous work on physical disorder, crime, neighborhood disad-
vantage and even police use of (deadly) force (Jacobs and O’Brien 1998; Sampson and 
Groves 1989; Taylor and Covington 1988). As such, they play an important role as poten-
tially confounding city characteristics.  
Second, we include two measures of crime.  The violent crime rate is based on the 
Uniform Crime Report data series “Offenses Known and Clearances by Arrest”. The 
measure captures the overall level of crime and is defined as the number of violent crimes 
per 100,000 residents.13 The overall level of violent crime has played an important role in 
                                                
13 The definition of violent crimes is based on the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) part I. Violent crimes in-
clude murder, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. 
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previous research on officer-involved killings (Ross 2015). It is generally seen as an alter-
native to threat-based explanation of police use of force insofar as police might simply 
use more (deadly) force when they encounter more violent crime (Fyfe 1980; Ross 2015:2; 
Smith 2003). The second measure of crime is based on policing: we control for the (logged) 
number of race-specific (black or white) arrests from the UCR “Arrests by Age, Sex, and 
Race” data-series. This variable accounts for the disproportionate minority exposure to 
police, a potential source of tension and conflict (Tyler et al., 2014; Geller et al., 2014).  It 
ensures that our estimates refer to police killings relative to arrests as a proxy for police-
citizen interactions. Given the number of arrests, the analyses capture whether police of-
ficers act differently and presumably feel more threatened in interactions with minority 
citizens. Finally, we include three additional variables from various sources. The number 
of sworn officers per 100,000 residents from the UCR data series “Law Enforcement Of-
ficers Killed and Assaulted”, whether or not the city has a black mayor, and whether or 
not the city is located in a southern state. 
 Some of the covariates based on the various Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data 
series have missing values. Data from the Supplementary Homicide Report used for the 
black-on-white homicide rate are particularly affected by this issue (Maltz 1999). Overall, 
out of 476 cities in our sample, 95 cases have missing values on at least one of the variables 
(20.0%). The main analyses presented in this paper are based on case-wise deletion. Sup-
plementary analysis use multiple imputation based on the chained equation approach to 
address this problem (Van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011). Aside from the var-
iables and interaction terms that are part of the final analyses, we include additional co-
variates based on previous years of UCR data. For example, the imputation model in-
cludes a measure of black-on-white homicides rates from 2004 to 2008 to improve the 
imputation of the contemporary measures used in our analyses. These additional varia-
bles substantially improve our imputation model.  
 
 24 
Results 
We begin our analysis by focusing on common measures of minority threat including the 
share of and change in the minority population, ethnic/racial polarization and black-on-
white homicide rates. This analysis revisits and expands Jacobs and O'Brien’s findings 
(1998) about the structural determinants of police killings in the 1980s. Table 3 presents 
the results from four negative-binomial regression models. They show the relation be-
tween various population characteristics, crime rates and other factors with the number 
of officer-involved killings between 2013 and 2015 across 381 cities in the United States. 
Model I and II present the results for African Americans and Modell III and IV for whites 
as a comparison.  
Model I shows that the proportion of African-Americans in the population is as-
sociated with the number of officer-involved killings of blacks, after controlling for a rich 
set of covariates.  Indeed, the coefficient estimate indicates that a one standard deviation 
increase in the proportion of black residents – for example, from the mean of 15.3% to 
32.5% – corresponds to an increase of the number of officer involved killings of blacks by 
49%. In contrast to Jacobs and O'Brien (1998) and others, however, we do not see this 
positive coefficient estimate for the proportion of black residents as support for the mi-
nority threat hypothesis. Instead, the number of police killings of blacks might simply be 
higher in cities with a larger black population because there are more black residents.  
Model II includes an exposure (or offset) term to address this question. It predicts 
the rate and not the count of black police killings. The result supports our argument. It 
shows that the proportion of African-American residents does not increase the rate of 
police killings of African Americans. Accordingly, the number of police killings of blacks 
is higher in cities with a larger black population, but rate of black police killings is unre-
lated to the proportion of black residents. Similarly, the change in the black population is 
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unrelated to the number of police killings of blacks. These results challenge the minority 
threat hypothesis based simply on population shares.  
 We next analyze alternate minority threat measures. These indicators go beyond 
the focus on population shares. In particular, Model I - IV include a measure of ethnic/ra-
cial polarization and black-on-white homicide rate. Both variables substantially increase 
the number of officer-involved killings of black but not of whites. In particular, the inci-
dence-rate ratio for ethnic/racial polarization is 1.396, indicating that a one standard de-
viation change in ethnic/racial polarization corresponds to a 39.6% higher number of po-
lice killings of blacks. A one standard deviation increase in the black-on-white homicide 
rate similarly corresponds to a 51.0% increase in the number of police killings of blacks. 
These findings are consistent for both the count and rate model that includes black pop-
ulation as an exposure variable (Model II), although one of the relevant coefficients is 
only marginally significant in the rate model. The black-on-black homicide rate, however, 
is unrelated to the number of police killings with a negative and statistically insignificant 
point estimate. Officer-killings of whites are driven by different factors They are unre-
lated to ethnic/racial polarization, black-on-white homicide rates and minority popula-
tion shares. Instead, the number of white arrests is an important predictor suggesting that 
(deadly) force against whites is higher when officers are involved in more (potentially 
violent) interactions with white residents.  
These findings not only revisit Jacobs and O'Brien’s work, it improves on it based 
on contemporary and higher-quality data.  These finding also extend their results in im-
portant ways. They provide clear support for a group-threat perspective but challenge 
the focus on population shares as one of the key measures in previous research. The find-
ings indicate that the number of officer-involved killings of blacks is substantially higher 
in polarized settings were the African-American and White population are equally sized 
and in those with a higher black-on-white homicide rate. Similar to related research on 
the size of the police force and the black arrest-rate, the findings support previous  
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 Table 3 - Group Threat and Killings by Police Officers across U.S. Cities, 2013 – 2015 
 Shootings of Blacks Shootings of Whites 
 Model I Model II Mode III Model IV 
 (Count) (Rate) (Count) (Rate) 
Population (log) 1.308*** 0.487*** 0.841*** -0.175 
 (0.151) (0.146) (0.173) (0.174) 
Prop. White 0.076 -0.010 0.177 -0.382* 
 (0.195) (0.201) (0.175) (0.177) 
Prop. Black 0.536*** -0.183 -0.338 -0.346 
 (0.161) (0.161) (0.226) (0.229) 
Change in Prop. Black -0.156* -0.108 0.170 0.168 
 (0.080) (0.078) (0.101) (0.101) 
Black/White Income Ratio -0.213 -0.230 -0.115 -0.089 
 (0.155) (0.166) (0.099) (0.098) 
Arrests Black (log) -0.012 -0.339**   
 (0.129) (0.130)   
Arrests White (log)   0.356* 0.355* 
   (0.167) (0.167) 
Violent Crime Rate 0.048 0.068 0.190 0.180 
 (0.083) (0.082) (0.103) (0.102) 
Prop. Divorced -0.032 0.070 0.344** 0.347** 
 (0.115) (0.117) (0.106) (0.106) 
Prop. Crowded Housing Units 0.024 0.075 0.174 0.220 
 (0.125) (0.126) (0.119) (0.121) 
Gini Index -0.094 -0.070 0.108 0.104 
 (0.123) (0.124) (0.111) (0.111) 
Prop. Poverty 0.052 -0.035 -0.240* -0.223 
 (0.124) (0.125) (0.121) (0.120) 
Black Mayor 0.069 0.161 -0.165 -0.164 
 (0.190) (0.183) (0.324) (0.324) 
Officers per 100,000 0.037 0.111 -0.241* -0.239* 
 (0.079) (0.080) (0.109) (0.108) 
South 0.034 0.069 0.124 0.138 
 (0.177) (0.177) (0.182) (0.183) 
Ethnic/Racial Polarization 0.334** 0.255 0.007 -0.149 
 (0.129) (0.138) (0.105) (0.108) 
Homicide Rate: Black on Black -0.350*** -0.170 0.138 0.165 
 (0.096) (0.094) (0.152) (0.153) 
Homicide Rate: Black on White 0.412*** 0.257** 0.121 0.122 
 (0.094) (0.095) (0.100) (0.100) 
Constant -1.647 3.125*** -3.731** -2.994* 
 (0.890) (0.905) (1.326) (1.326) 
Note: N=381; Estimates based on negative-binomial regressions. Rate models include offset defined as the 
logged Black/White population in 100,000s. p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; std. errors in parenthesis. 
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research that highlights crime-threat as one of the key mechanisms that explains group 
threat.  
 
Group Threat and Minority the Race Gap in America’s Police Departments 
In the second part of our analysis, we focus on the effect of minority representation 
in police departments on the use of deadly police force. Our argument suggests that the 
proportional representation of African-Americans in the police force not only reduces the 
number of officer-involved killings but more importantly mitigates various factors asso-
ciated with group threat. To examine this argument, we extend our model with the pro-
portional representation index (PRI) and a number of interaction terms between the index 
and our measures of group threat. The index is defined as the share of black police officers 
divided by the share of the black population. Figure 2 shows the share of black police 
officers and black population on the left side and the distribution of the index on the right 
side across the cities in our sample. A value of one indicates equal representation insofar 
the share of African-Americans in the police force is the same as the share in the general 
population. Lower values as in most cities across the United States indicate an un-
derrepresentation of blacks in the police. Table 4 presents regression models that show 
Figure 2 - The Race Gap in Police Agencies across the United States, 2013 
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the effect of the proportional representation index together with the interaction terms on 
the number of officer-involved killings of blacks. Models I and II first show the effect of 
the index itself. The point estimate is negative and substantial indicating that the number 
of officer-involved killings of blacks is lower in cities with proportional representation of 
blacks in the police force. However, the coefficient estimate is not statistically significant 
in the rate model (p-value 0.35) so that we cannot draw clear conclusions about the rela-
tion between the rate of police killings and the representation of African-Americans in 
the police force. This finding is in line with previous research based on weak data. Using 
data from the F.B.I. Supplementary Homicide Reports, Smith (2003) similarly finds no 
clear relation between the racial composition of the police force and officer-involved kill-
ings. Accordingly, the finding about an overall effect of Black officer representation on 
the number of officer-involved killings of blacks is inconclusive.  
Models II – VI extend the regressions with additional interaction terms between the 
representation index and our two measures of group threat:  polarization and black-on-
white killings.  For both variables, the interaction term is negative and substantial, indi-
cating that the proportional representation of black officers decreases the effect of other 
factors that are commonly associated with group threat. In particular, the incidence-rate 
ratio of ethnic/racial polarization and the black-on-white homicide rate is 1.30 and 1.28 
respectively when the proportional representation index is at the mean of 0.74. At this 
level, a one standard deviation change in ethnic/racial polarization and the black-on-
white homicide rate corresponds to a 30% and 28% increase in officer-involved killings 
of blacks respectively. In cities with a higher level of African-American representation in 
the police department, however, the size of the effect decreases or, correspondingly, in-
creases at lower representation levels. 
Figure 3 illustrates this pattern for polarization and the black-on-white homicide 
rate. It shows the incidence-rate ratio for a one standard deviation change in ethnic/racial  
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Table 4 - Representation of Black Police Officers and Police Killings of Blacks, 2013 – 2015 
 
Model 
I 
Model 
II 
Mode 
III 
Model 
IV 
Mode V 
Model 
VI 
 (Count) (Rate) (Count) (Rate) (Count) (Rate) 
Population (log) 1.413*** 0.521*** 1.434*** 0.538*** 1.425*** 0.519*** 
 (0.154) (0.150) (0.153) (0.150) (0.155) (0.151) 
Prop. White 0.035 -0.030 0.023 -0.044 0.032 -0.027 
 (0.197) (0.202) (0.196) (0.202) (0.194) (0.200) 
Prop. Black 0.539*** -0.189 0.518** -0.209 0.579*** -0.158 
 (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) 
Change in Prop. Black -0.158 -0.108 -0.160 -0.105 -0.173* -0.117 
 (0.081) (0.079) (0.083) (0.080) (0.084) (0.080) 
Black/White Income Ratio -0.233 -0.236 -0.261 -0.252 -0.209 -0.202 
 (0.161) (0.167) (0.161) (0.167) (0.161) (0.168) 
Arrests Black (log) -0.101 -0.367** -0.110 -0.373** -0.096 -0.354** 
 (0.131) (0.132) (0.130) (0.132) (0.133) (0.134) 
Violent Crime Rate 0.079 0.078 0.095 0.090 0.139 0.121 
 (0.084) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.088) (0.087) 
Prop. Divorced -0.058 0.062 -0.068 0.052 -0.083 0.045 
 (0.116) (0.118) (0.115) (0.117) (0.117) (0.118) 
Prop. Crowded Housing Units 0.073 0.088 0.087 0.100 0.019 0.052 
 (0.125) (0.127) (0.124) (0.126) (0.130) (0.131) 
Gini Index 0.009 -0.032 0.037 -0.002 0.014 -0.025 
 (0.130) (0.130) (0.129) (0.130) (0.129) (0.130) 
Prop. Poverty -0.035 -0.061 -0.064 -0.085 -0.043 -0.069 
 (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.127) (0.127) 
Black Mayor 0.098 0.170 0.139 0.199 0.126 0.193 
 (0.188) (0.183) (0.189) (0.183) (0.187) (0.182) 
Officers per 100,000 0.027 0.108 0.026 0.107 0.013 0.101 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.077) (0.079) (0.078) (0.080) 
South 0.040 0.074 0.053 0.087 0.057 0.095 
 (0.175) (0.177) (0.174) (0.177) (0.175) (0.178) 
Ethnic/Racial Polarization 0.327* 0.252 0.611*** 0.476** 0.270* 0.204 
 (0.129) (0.138) (0.172) (0.175) (0.132) (0.141) 
Homicide Rate: Black on Black -0.332*** -0.162 -0.331*** -0.159 -0.349*** -0.177 
 (0.097) (0.094) (0.097) (0.094) (0.097) (0.094) 
Homicide Rate: Black on White 0.389*** 0.247** 0.377*** 0.236* 0.663*** 0.460** 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.096) (0.149) (0.150) 
Proportional Representation  -0.609* -0.226 -0.594** -0.248 -0.672** -0.257 
Index (PRI) (0.247) (0.242) (0.206) (0.202) (0.240) (0.236) 
       
PRI x Ethnic/Racial Polarization   -0.455** -0.356*   
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Note: N=381; Estimates based on negative-binomial regressions. Rate models include offset term defined 
as the logged number of Blacks in 100,000s.  The Proportional Representation Index (PRI) is defined as 
the proportion of black police officers relative to the proportion of black residents. 
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
polarization (Figure 3a) and a similar change in the black-on-white homicide rate (Figure 
3b) as a function of the proportional representation index. In cities with a representation 
index of zero (no African-American police officers), the coefficient estimates are large 
with an almost 100% and 60% increase in the number of officer-involved killings of blacks 
for a one standard deviation change for polarization and the black-on-white homicide 
rate respectively. As the representation of African-Americans in the police improves, 
however, the effect of a one standard deviation change in both polarization and the black-
on-white homicide rate decreases substantially. At the extreme with twice as many Afri-
can-American police officers as residents or a representation index of 2 (4.8% of depart-
ments have an index above two), the point estimates are negative but statistically insig-
nificant.  
Overall, these findings provide strong support for our argument. While it remains 
unclear whether the representation of African-American in the police is related to the 
number of officer-involved killings itself, the interaction terms indicate that inclusive po-
lice departments that proportionally represents the population it serves are less sensitive 
to various threat factors. A diverse police force mitigates group threat and thereby re-
duces the number of officer-involved killings. 
 
   
(0.175) (0.167)   
PRI x Homicide Rate: Black on      -0.543* -0.417 
White     (0.235) (0.236) 
       
Constant -0.651 3.453*** -0.632 3.480*** -0.708 3.340*** 
 (0.948) (0.964) (0.935) (0.950) (0.965) (0.980) 
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Conclusion 
Understanding the determinants of officer involved killings across the Unites States is a 
nascent research area with few empirical studies (Hirschfield 2015; Zimring 
forthcoming).  Aided by a comprehensive and unique data collection effort, this study 
makes important progress toward understanding the driving factors of police killings in 
the contemporary Unites States. The findings offer three explanations of police shootings. 
First, our results indicate that group threat is not simply driven by population shares and 
in-migration of out-group members as suggested by previous studies. Instead, the num-
ber and rate of officer involved killings of African-Americans is substantially higher in 
cities with a high level of ethno-racial polarization where two equal-sized groups face 
each. This finding moves beyond the focus on the presence or in-migration of minority 
groups. It highlights the importance of group conflict theories focused on polarization 
(Esteban and Ray 1994; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005) for officer-involved killings.  
Figure 3 - Effect of the Prop. of White Officers on Police Killings 
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Second, similar to a number of recent studies on group threat, crime threat and in 
particular racial crime threat, seems to be an important driving factor. Indeed, the black-
on-white homicide rate is a significant predictor of officer-involved killings whereas black-
on-black homicides are unrelated to police killings. These results provide support for the 
threat of black crime hypothesis. The finding that police killings of African-Americans 
increase as a function of the black-on-white homicide rate is consistent with a body of 
social science evidence of police discrimination toward minority citizens observed by so-
cial scientists under a wide variety of sampling and measurement conditions (Epp, 
Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014; Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss 2007; Kochel, Wil-
son, and Mastrofski 2011; Legewie 2016; see, generally O’Flaherty 2015). Several studies 
find that when blacks victimize whites, the high value attached to a white victim and the 
racial fears of authorities engender severe treatment (Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski 
1990; Paternoster, Brame, and Bacon 2007).  
Third, minority representation in the police might not reduce the number of of-
ficer-involved killings itself, but their presence mitigates different dimensions of threat. 
Indeed, our findings indicate that the relation between polarization/black-on-white hom-
icide rate and the number of officer-involved killings is weaker in settings with a propor-
tional representation of minority group in the police force. These findings make new and 
substantial contributions to our understanding of a highly contentious social, cultural 
and political issue. They indicate that group threat continues to be an important driver of 
officer-involved killings, even after controlling for the factual reality of killings of police.  
Our research also has implications for a decades old push to diversify the police-
force. Prior research on the benefits of a diverse police force reached no conclusion.  Other 
than a normative argument, there was no reliable evidence that a diverse police force was 
either more effective in responding to crime, or able to bridge the racial breach in trust in 
the police.  Our results provide evidence that a diverse police force that proportionally 
represents the population it serves might not necessarily reduce the number of officer-
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involved killings directly, but mitigates the role of various factors associated with group 
threat and thereby eases the tensions between the police and African-American commu-
nities.  
Our study also has broader implications for group-threat theories and minority rep-
resentation in state agencies and bureaucracies. Previous research on group threat has 
generally emphasized the interest of the dominant group as a driving factor for minority 
threat (for an exception see Holmes 2000; Smith and Holmes 2014). From this perspective, 
police use of (deadly) force is driven by structural factors that create pressure to maintain 
racial hierarchies and inequalities. Our argument, however, highlights the importance of 
considering the police as a distinct social group that contributes to the ways in which 
group threat plays out. From this perspective, the police force can aggravate or alleviate 
intergroup conflict, such as through the diversity of police officers. This argument ex-
tends previous research on inter-group conflict and group threat that has largely focused 
on population dynamics without considering the mediating role of state agencies. It also 
points to the importance of minority representation in bureaucracies as a social good. 
While previous research has largely focused on the role of descriptive representation in 
parliament or public office for substantive representation on policy issues (e.g. Lloren 
2015) or on minority and women representatives as role models (e.g. Beaman et al. 2012), 
our research shows that minority representation in bureaucracies or the police can miti-
gate conflict and group threat. 
While our dataset on police killings overcomes important data limitations from pre-
vious research and the analyses control for all common measures in previous research, 
the findings are limited by the observational nature of the data (Legewie 2012; Morgan 
and Winship 2014). Future research should use experimental or quasi-experimental de-
signs to examine the role of a diverse police force for the police use of (deadly) force and 
other outcomes.  
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